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authority and usurped the legislative function of the Congress."
The three dissenting justices are of the opinion that the regulation




Torts-Medical Malpractice-Rejection of "Locality" Rule
In Pederson v. Dumouchel,1 plaintiff brought a malpractice action
against a physician, dentist, and hospital to recover for brain dam-
age allegedly sustained as a result of an operation.2 He had suffered
a broken jaw and was placed under the care of Dr. Dumouchel,
who associated a dentist to reduce the fracture. The operation was
performed between 10:20 a.m. and noon the following day. The
dentist had no working knowledge of the use of a general anesthetic,
which was administered by a hospital nurse. No medical doctor
was present during the operation; it was Dr. Dumouchel's after-
noon off and he had left the hospital before the operation com-
menced. Plaintiff suffered convulsive seizures in the recovery room.
About 1:30 p.m. another doctor was located who suspected brain
damage, consulted a neurosurgeon in Seattle, 110 miles away, and
arranged to have plaintiff taken there. He remained unconscious
for a month. Expert testimony supported the finding that plaintiff
suffered severe brain damage caused by the administration of the
anesthetic. Dr. Dumouchel was charged with negligently failing to
assume the responsibility for the patient's medical care while in
surgery. The trial judge instructed the jury that the standard of
care to be applied was "the learning, skill, care, and diligence ordi-
" United States v. Correll, 36 U.S.L.W. 4055, 4057 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1967).3
7 Id.
1 Wash. 2d - , 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
'The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of the standard of care
applied to physicians and surgeons. Generally, the standard for dentists is
the same as that applied to doctors.
Much that is said herein about the locality rule is applicable to hospitals
as well as physicians. However, hospital liability for negligence necessarily
involves additional factors such as administrative supervision, ANNOT., 14
A.L.R.3d 873 (1967), agency principles when plaintiff seeks to establish
hospital liability for the negligence of a physician, ANNOT., 69 A.L.R.2d
305 (1960) and the physical facilities of the hospital. See 43 N.C.L. REv.
469 (1965). The Pederson court held that plaintiff's case against the hospital
was sufficient to go to the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See
ANNOT., 173 A.L.R. 535 (1948); ANNOT., 9 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1966).
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narily possessed and practiced by others in the same profession...
in the same or in similar localities . . . ."- In holding this instruc-
tion to be reversible error, the Washington Supreme Court took the
position that the degree of care required is that of an average com-
petent practitioner acting in the same or similar circumstances, and
that local practice within geographic proximity is only one factor to
be considered. The court set forth the following rule:
A qualified medical . . . practitioner should be subject to
liability, in an action for negligence, if he fails to exercise that
degree of care and skill which is expected of the average prac-
titioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in the same or
similar circumstances. This standard of care is that established
in an area coextensive with the medical and professional means
available in those centers that are readily accessible for appro-
priate treatment of the patient.4
Although the opinion is somewhat ambiguous, it appears that
this court has discarded the "locality" rule and has set forth a stan-
dard of care based on the conduct of a reasonable practitioner acting
under the same or similar circumstances. If so, the court has taken
a major step in conforming the law of malpractice to the conditions
of medical practice as they exist today.
The courts have long encountered difficulty in stating a general
rule by which to measure the standard of care for physicians and
surgeons. Generally, the physician is required to possess and exer-
cise that degree of skill and care ordinarily possessed and exer-
cised by physicians under similar circumstances.5 The early cases
imposed a narrow qualification on the standard by requiring that it
be determined by reference to the "same" locality or community in
which the defendant-doctor practices.' The locality rule is based
on the premise that a doctor in a small community does not have the
same opportunities and resources as do urban doctors to keep
abreast of developments in his profession, and therefore can not
'- Wash. 2d - , , 431 P.2d 973, 976 (1967).
Id. at - , 431 P.2d at 978.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
'E.g., Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872). The cases are collected
in McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV.
549, 569 (1959).
Many courts impose various combinations of additional qualifications on
the standard of care such as an "average" physician "in good standing"
engaged in "the same general line of practice." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 299A (1963).
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be held to the same standard. Since laymen are generally considered
unqualified to pass judgment on medical questions, courts consis-
tently hold that there can be no finding of negligence without the aid
of expert testimony.7 It follows that the competence of an expert to
testify depends upon his familiarity with the customary practice in
the locality. This narrow limitation, coupled with the reluctance
of any doctor in the community to testify against another,8 makes it
virtually impossible for a plaintiff to make out a malpractice case in
jurisdictions applying the "same" locality rule.
Most courts have realized that the "same" locality is too narrow,
and have extended the rule to include "same or similar" localities.0
This liberalization makes it somewhat easier for a plaintiff to obtain
experts willing to testify favorably, but it does not alleviate the pos-
sibility that a few local doctors can set a standard below that re-
quired by law. A few courts operating under a "similar" localities
rule have not been content to determine similarity on the basis of
population, and have attempted to compare similar "medical locali-
ties."' 0 Recent decisions indicate that the courts are becoming
much more liberal in finding similarity," admitting expert testi-
mony and taking judicial notice that two localities are similar12 or
Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949); Graham v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 46 Ill. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964); Berardi v.
Menicks, 340 Mass. 396, 164 N.E.2d 544 (1960); Miller v. Raaen, 273
Minn. 109, 139 N.W.2d 877 (1966); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88
S.E.2d 762 (1955); Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352
(1965). Expert testimony is not required, however, if the negligence is so
grossly apparent or treatment of such common occurrence that a layman
would be able to appraise it. Graham v. St. Luke's Hosp., 46 Ill. App. 2d
147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140
N.W.2d 139 (1966); Hammer v. Rosen, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 165 N.E.2d 756
(1960).
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 167 (3d ed. 1964); Seidelson, Medical
Malpractice and the Relluctant Expert, 16 CATr. U.L. REv. 158 (1966).
Engle v. Clarke, 346 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1961); Small v. Howard, 128
Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880); Bradshaw v. Blaine, 1 Mich. App. 50,
134 N.W.2d 386 (1965) ; Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. 1, 76 S.E.2d 461 (1953);
Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).
10 Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932); Sampson v.
Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Cavellaro v. Sharpe 84
R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956).11Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (a
Philadelphia surgeon permitted to testify in Baltimore); Riley v. Layton,
329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964) (California physician familiar with small-
town practice qualified to testify in Utah town); Couch v. Hutchison, 135
So. 2d 18 (Fla. App. 1961) (Florida surgeon allowed to testify on teachings
of a Philadelphia medical school).
12 Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312 (Fla. App. 1962).
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that the witness was familiar with general practice in the com-
munity.
13
In furtherence of the tendency to liberalize the area qualification
of the standard, the courts have devised additional ways to minimize
or circumvent the effect of the locality rule. First, the conduct of a
general practitioner is tested by (1) the degree of skill and knowl-
edge possessed by the other physicians in the same or similar locality,
and (2) the degree of care and diligence exercised by those physi-
cians in applying their skill. 4 Malpractice liability may result either
through lack of skill and knowledge or neglect to apply it, if pos-
sessed.' 5 In Williams v. Chamberlain,16 a physician was charged only
with failure to exercise the necessary "care." The Missouri Supreme
Court, by strong dictum, stated that the original reasons for the
locality rule pertain to the inability of a rural physician to possess
the skill and knowledge of urban physicians; that where a physician
is charged only with failure to exercise due "care," the locality
should make no difference and there should be a national standard.
While the distinction is perhaps theoretically sound, as a practical
matter it may not mean very much. Can the courts really tell
whether a physician's conduct was a failure to exercise "care" or a
failure to possess knowledge to exercise it?
Second, as the courts learn more about medical practices, they
are beginning to formulate with specificity what is required of the
reasonable physician in certain circumstances, rather than de-
pending upon experts to formulate it. For example, once the
doctor-patient relationship is established, a doctor has a duty to ex-
amine the patient,' 7 not to abandon the patient until the relation-
ship terminates,' 8 to disclose any abnormal risks in the treatment,' 9
1 1Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).
1 4D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAmS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES,
§ 8.04 (1966).
"= DeLaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190, 164 So. 2d 762 (1964); New-
port v. Hyde, 244 Miss. 870, 147 So. 2d 113 (1962); Williams v. Chamber-
lain, 316 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1958); Mehigan v. Sheehan, 94 N.H. 274, 51
A.2d 632 (1947)." 316 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1958).
" E.g., Stephens v. Williams, 226 Ala. 534, 147 So. 608 (1933) ; Wheatley
v. Heideman, 251 Iowa 695, 102 N.W.2d 343 (1960).
18E.g., Capps v. Valk, 189 Kan. 287, 369 P.2d 238 (1962); O'Neil v.
Montefiore Hospital, 11 A.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960); see ANNOT.,
57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1958).
"Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C.
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to instruct patients how to carry out treatment (especially drugs),20
and to follow the progress of treatment.2 If the facts of a particular
case reveal a clear breach of such a duty, the court may permit a
jury to find negligence without the aid of expert testimony,22 the
result being to minimize or remove the effect of the locality rule.
Third, the court may simply disregard the locality rule. In
Koury v. Folio, 23 a Greensboro, North Carolina physician was
charged with prescribing an injection of a drug containing strepto-
mycin for plaintiff's nine-month old baby for treatment of a cold
and bronchitis; afterward the child became deaf. The label on the
drug container stated "Not for Pediatric Use," accompanied by a
warning against use for children. The plaintiff's expert witness
testified that deafness was a known hazard, and, in effect, that such
use was dangerous. The opinion does not reveal whether or not the
expert was familiar with the practice in Greensboro. The defendant
testified that other pediatricians in Greensboro were then using the
drug in like dosages for children as young as nine months of age.
Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient
to justify a finding by the jury that the defendant was negligent.
By disregarding the locality rule, it appears that the court found
plaintiff's evidence sufficient to prove that defendant's conduct sub-
jected the child to an unreasonable risk of harm, notwithstanding
the fact that such conduct was customary in Greensboro.
Most writers generally agree that today the locality of practice
is of diminishing importance.24 As early as 1916, in Viita v. Flein-
nuing,25 the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the concept that the
153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964) ; Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762
(1955).2* E.g., Beck v. The German Klinik, 78 Iowa 696, 43 N.W. 617 (1889);
McKenzie v. Siegel, 261 Minn. 299, 112 N.W.2d 353 (1961).
1 Revels v. Pohle, 101 Ariz. 208, 418 P.2d 364 (1966); Sinz v. Owens,
33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949); Willard v. Hutson, 234 Or. 148, 378
P.2d 966 (1963).
"2 Revels v. Pohle, 101 Ariz. 208, 418 P.2d 364 (1966). "[L]aymen
can say that in all cases where there are continual complaints of pain from a
patient over a substantial period of time, that it is a departure from standard
medical practice for the doctor to fail to examine the patient in any man-
ner." Id. at - , 418 P.2d at 367. Capps v. Valk, 189 Kan. 287, 369 P.2d
238 (1962); Engle v. Clarke, 346 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1961).23272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
24 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES,
§ 8.06 (1966); McCoID, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VAND. L. REv. 549 (1959); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 167 (3d ed. 1964);
14 STAN. L. REv. 884 (1962).
2' 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916).
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locality is an overall qualification of the standard. That court stated,
in effect, that the standard of care should be expressed in terms of
"like circumstances," and the locality should be considered only as
one of the circumstances. Since 1916, this development has gained
judicial support,28 some of which has been by word rather than by
deed.17 If this rule is applied as stated, an expert otherwise qualified
would not be required to possess personal knowledge of the stan-
dards in the same or in a similar locality. He would be permitted to
testify to standards of care possessed by the profession generally,
and if any evidence concerning local practice is before the court, the
jury could consider it in determining the weight to be given the
expert's testimony. This rule greatly increases a plaintiff's ability to
find favorable expert witnesses as well as easing his overall burden
of proof. In Murphy v. Little,2" the Georgia Supreme Court applied
this concept of a national standard of care operating under a statute
which requires a physician or surgeon to exercise a reasonable de-
gree of care and skill.
The compelling interpretation of the Pederson case is that the
court reached the same result as the Murphy case without the aid of
a statute, and thus effectively discarded the locality rule.2" Super-
ficially, the case is subject to the criticism that by its definition of
" Flock v. J. C. Palumbo Fruit Co., 63 Idaho 220, 118 P.2d 707 (1941);
McGulpin v. Bessemer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950) ; Carbonne v.
Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); H-odgson v. Bigelow, 335
Pa. 497, 7 A.2d 338 (1939).
- Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949). The California
Supreme Court said "The essential factor is knowledge of similarity of
conditions; geographical proximity is only one factor to be considered." Id.
at 756, 205 P.2d at 7. However, when plaintiff argued that the area for
determination of the standard should be the San Joaquin Valley, containing
two cities of over 50,000 people and smaller towns including the community
of defendant-doctor's practice, the court balked, saying that plaintiff "seeks
to advance this development beyond permissible bounds." Id. at 755,
205 P.2d at 6.
"' 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965).
" In a more recent Washington case, Versteeg v. Mowery, - Wash. 2d
-, 435, P.2d 540 (1967), the Supreme Court cited Pederson with ap-
proval. At first blush, the language of the court seems to indicate that the court
has retained the locality rule. However, the plaintiff totally failed to estab-
lish any standard of care at all. The expert testimony merely offered evi-
dence that each surgeon uses different surgical methods when inserting a
plastic implant into female breasts. The court said that a jury is not capable
of choosing between conflicting standards of the various expert witnesses.
"[T]he medical standard or the minimal standard may be the same here that
it is in Beverly Hills or New York or some place else, but nobody has said
so." 435 P.2d at 543-44.
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geographic proximity 30 it adds confusion to an already confused
area of the law. Such phrases as "coextensive with the means avail-
able," and "readily accessible" mean very little in themselves with-
out further judicial interpretation. The real significance of the
case, however, lies in what the court intended by defining geographic
proximity in this manner. One possible interpretation is that the
court has retained a "similar" locality qualification on the standard,
and has defined a "medical locality" making the "similar locality"
a broader concept. This would be entirely inconsistent with the
court's statement that the standard of care is to be expressed in terms
of "the same or similar circumstances," and that locality is to be
only one of the circumstances. It seems probable, upon analysis of
the entire opinion, that the court did not intend to retain any con-
cept of geographic qualification, especially since it stated that it is
no longer proper "to limit the definition of the standard of care...
to the practice or custom of . . .a geographical area."3 1 The more
tenable interpretation is that the standard of care is that required
of a reasonable physician acting under the same or similar circum-
stances. The geographic proximity remains important, but only to
the extent that it is necessary to determine what the reasonable doc-
tor would have done in the same or similar situation. An expert,
witness, unfamiliar with customary practice and the local level of
knowledge and skill, would be competent to give his opinion of what
is required of the profession generally. If the local practice differs
from the expert testimony from the plaintiff's side, then it rests with
defendant's counsel to bring such evidence before the court. Then,
under proper instruction, it is the province of the jury to determine
what is required of the average physician under these circumstances.
This is a most welcome decision. Most courts are operating un-
der standards of care encumbered with rigid qualifications to the
point that it is often difficult to discern that the malpractice action is
grounded in negligence. The Pederson court recognized that the
controlling question should be whether or not the conduct of the
physician subjects the patient to an unreasonable risk of harm, and
not what is the practice in the particular locality. It becomes ever
more apparent that the original reasons employed to justify the lo-
30 Note 4, supra, and accompanying text.
" Pederson v. Dumouchel, - Wash. 2d - -, 431 P.2d 973, 978
(1967).
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cality rule no longer exist.32 In Pederson the court reasoned "Now
there is no lack of opportunity for a physician or surgeon to keep
abreast of the advances in his profession .... "3 The standards re-
quired by state medical licensing boards, the comprehensive coverage
of medical journals, the "detail men" of drug companies, and post
graduate courses serve to keep physicians abreast of national stan-
dards. 4 It is not contended that the facilities in smaller communities
are now equal to those in larger towns and cities, nor that the ability
and methods of treatment are everywhere the same. It is contended,
however, that the older barriers no longer exist that would prevent
any competent physician from knowing the extent of his ability
and the capabilities of his facilities. There is nothing to prevent the
doctor from knowing what skills and facilities are readily accessible
for the proper treatment of the patient. "Increasingly realistic
judges . . . will acknowledge that the legal rule ceases when the
reasons for it cease."1
3 5
HAROLD N. BYNUM
Wills-Ademption by Trustee of Incompetent Testator in
North Carolina-Adoption of the Intent Rule
In Grant v. Banks' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the sale by a trustee of property specifically devised by his ward
prior to incapacitation did not adeem the devise and that proceeds
from the sale still remaining in the estate were recoverable under
"In 1940, in Tevdt v. Haugen. 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183, 188
(1940), the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:
"The duty of a doctor to his patient is measured by conditions as they
exist, and not what they have been in the past or may be in the future.
Today, with rapid methods of transportation and easy means of com-
munication, the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor is
not fulfilled merely by utilizing the means at hand in the particular vil-
lage where he is practicing. So far as medical treatment is concerned,
the borders of the locality or community have, in effect, been extended so
as to include those centers readily accessible where appropriate treatment
may be had which the local physician, because of his limited facilities or
training is unable to give."
" Pederson v. Dumouchel, - Wash. 2d , , 431 P.2d 973, 977
(1967).
'Id. at - , 431 P.2d at 977.
" D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES,
§ 8.06 (1966).
1270 N.C. 473, 155 S.E.2d 87 (1967).
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